Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
Extensive evidence confirms that creating the conditions for a deep and efficient financial
system can contribute robustly to sustained economic growth and lower poverty (e.g., see
Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000, Honohan 2004a, and World Bank 2001a). Moreover, in
all levels of development, continued efficient and effective provision of financial services
requires that financial policies and financial system structures be adjusted as needed in
response to financial innovations and shifts in the broader macroeconomic and institu-
tional environment....
1
2
3
4
Chapter 4
5
Assessing Financial Structure and 6
Financial Development 7
8
9
10
4.1 Overview
11
4.1.1 Motivation for Assessing Financial Structure and Financial
Development 12
Extensive evidence confirms that creating the conditions for a deep and efficient financial
system can contribute robustly to sustained economic growth and lower poverty (e.g., see
A
Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000, Honohan 2004a, and World Bank 2001a). Moreover, in
all levels of development, continued efficient and effective provision of financial services B
requires that financial policies and financial system structures be adjusted as needed in
response to financial innovations and shifts in the broader macroeconomic and institu- C
tional environment.
D
4.1.2 Scope of Analysis
E
The goals of financial structure analysis and development assessment for a country are to
(a) assess the current provision of financial services, (b) analyze the factors behind miss-
F
ing or underdeveloped services and markets, and (c) identify the obstacles to the efficient
and effective provision of a broad range of financial services. The dimensions along which
service provision must be assessed include the range, scale (depth) and reach (breadth or
G
penetration), and the cost and quality of financial services provided to the economy. At a
high level of abstraction, those services are usually classified as including the following: H
• Making payments
I
• Mobilizing savings
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
• Allocating capital funds
1 • Monitoring users of funds
• Transforming risk
2
Thus, the ideal financial system will provide, for example, reliable and inexpensive
money transfer within the country, reaching remote areas and poor households. There
3
will be remunerative deposit facilities and other investment opportunities offering liquid-
ity and a reasonable risk-return tradeoff. Entrepreneurs will have access to a range of
4 sources for funds for their working- and fixed-capital formation; affordable mortgage and
consumer finance will be available to households. The credit renewal decisions of banks
5 and the market signals coming from organized markets in traded securities will help ensure
that good use continues to be made of investable funds. Insurance intermediaries and
6 the portfolio possibilities offered by liquid securities markets will help maximize the risk
pooling and the shifting of risk at a reasonable price to entities that are able and willing
7 to absorb it.
The scope of financial structure analysis and of development assessment is fairly
8 extensive—as illustrated in the above list—and those structural issues cannot be simply
broken into self-contained segments corresponding to existing institutional arrangements.
9 Structural and development issues arise across the entire spectrum of financial markets
and intermediaries, including banking, insurance, securities markets, and nonbank
10 intermediation. They often demand consideration of factors for which well-adapted and
standardized quantification is not readily available. Therefore, the challenge is to trans-
late those wide-ranging and somewhat abstract concepts into a concrete and practical
11 assessment methodology.
The suggested approach begins with a fact-finding dimension that seeks to benchmark
12 the existing financial services provided in (and available to) the national economy—in
terms of range, scale and reach, cost, and quality—against international practice. Such
A benchmarking should help pinpoint areas of systemic underperformance, which can then
be further analyzed to diagnose the causes of the underperformance against realistic tar-
B gets. To some extent, the benchmarking can be quantified, but, in practice, quantification
must be supplemented by in-depth qualitative information. The question being asked in
C every case is, if quality or quantity is deficient, then what has caused this deficiency?
Deficiencies will often be traced to a wide range of structural, institutional, and policy
D factors.
• First, there may be gaps or needed changes in the financial infrastructure, both
E in the soft infrastructures of legal, information, and regulatory systems and in the
harder transactional technology infrastructures that include payments and settle-
F ments systems and communications more generally.
• Second, there may be flaws or needed adaptations in regulatory or tax policy
G (including competition policy) whose inadequacies or unintended side effects dis-
tort or suppress the functioning of the financial system to an extent not warranted
H by the goals of the policy.
• Third, digging deeper, there may be broad governance issues at the national level,
I for example, where existing institutional structures impede good policy making
(especially favoring incumbents over newcomers).
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Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
• Fourth, financial sector deficiencies may also be traced to problems in the country’s
wider economic infrastructures, including the education, transportation, and com-
1
munications systems. Furthermore, many developing countries are faced with the
difficulty that effective finance requires a scale of activity that may be beyond the 2
reach of small economies, populated as they are by a small number of small clients,
small intermediaries, and small organized markets (see Bossone, Honohan, and 3
Long 2002). An effective financial system, while contributing to wider economic
growth and development, is also somewhat dependent on the wider economic 4
environment—not least the macroeconomic and fiscal environment.
The most distinctive feature of financial structure analysis and development assess-
5
ment is the focus on the users of financial services and on the efficiency and effectiveness
of the system in meeting user needs. Policy reforms that benefit users and that promote 6
financial development are generally favored in such analysis and assessments.1 The pro-
posed assessment framework is also guided by the presumption, which is based on a sizable 7
body of empirical evidence, that an effective and efficient financial system is best provided
by market-driven financial service providers, with the main role of government being to 8
serve as regulator and provider of robust financial infrastructure. Therefore, the establish-
ment of a government-sponsored financial service provider is not seen as likely to be the 9
first-best solution to deficiencies. Instead, the role and effectiveness of financial service
providers are assessed regardless of whether they are government owned. Assessment has 10
two phases: information gathering and analytical reporting.
11
Phase 1: Information-Gathering Phase
12
To reflect this focus on users and the services they require, the overall assessment needs
to adopt a functional approach and not to be confined to a perspective that is based on
existing institutional dividing lines between different groups of providers.2 Nevertheless,
A
much of the information gathering will inevitably reflect those institutional divisions, not
the least because national regulatory structures are typically organized along those lines B
(notwithstanding the trend to integrated supervisory agencies in several countries).
In addition, the adequacy of the legal, information, and payments infrastructures C
and of other aspects of the overall policy environment are central to the development
assessment: each has relevance cutting across any single sector. Yet, information about D
the effectiveness of the infrastructures and about the unintended and hidden side effects
of the policy environment is often obtained only by learning how each sector works. E
Likewise, the competitive structure, efficiency, and product mix of the various sectors
can be explained only on the basis of an understanding of the design and performance of F
the infrastructures. So the information-gathering phase of the assessment needs to have a
sectoral, as well as an infrastructural, dimension. Cross-cutting policy issues such as taxa- G
tion also need to be kept in mind. Finally, user perspective can be helpful, especially in
identifying gaps in providing markets and services, as well as in discovering deficiencies H
in quality and cost that might not be revealed from analysis of the suppliers.
The information-gathering phase of the assessment is multidimensional. Typical com-
I
ponents of the information-gathering phase may include the following:
71
Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
• Quantitative benchmarking of the size, depth, cost and price efficiency, and the
1 penetration (breadth) of financial intermediaries and markets, using internation-
ally comparable data (section 4.2)
2 • Reviews of legal, informational, and transaction technology infrastructures (sec-
tion 4.3)
3 • Sectoral development reviews, providing a more in-depth assessment of service
provision, structure, and regulation (Sectors covered will normally include com-
4 mercial banking and nearbanking, insurance, and securities sectors and may also
include some or all of the collective savings institutions and of the financial aspects
5 of public pension funds, specialized development intermediaries, mortgage finance,
and microfinance. Those sectors need to refer to the functioning both of the
6 industry [financial services providers] itself and of the regulatory apparatus [section
4.4].)
• Demand-side reviews of access to, and use of, financial services by households,
7 microenterprises, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and large enterprises (sec-
tion 4.5)
8 • Reviews of selected additional cross-cutting aspects of the policy environment (for
example, distorting taxation and subsidization of financial intermediation) and of
9 implications for competition of cross-sectoral ownership structures (Those reviews
also may mention missing product issues, thus focusing on whether key financial
10 products—such as leasing, factoring, and venture capital—are available and iden-
tifying the reasons for their absence [see section 4.6].)
11
12 Phase 2: Analytical and Reporting Phases
The relative importance of the components of the information-gathering phase and the
A scope of their analysis will vary according to country circumstances. This wide-ranging
scope of information presents a challenge to assessors who must, in the analytical and
B reporting phases, synthesize the information to identify the major axes of needed policy
reform and of infrastructural strengthening for stability and development. Segments of the
C financial system that are already active, but for which the benchmarking exercise suggests
shortcomings, will deserve more-detailed attention. For segments that are missing or are
not very developed, the discussion of needed policies can be confined to the level of broad
D strategy. How those components can be integrated into a policy framework is discussed
in section 4.7.
E
F 4.1.3 Stability and Development: Complementarities Despite the Different
Perspective
G Financial structure analysis and development assessment inevitably overlaps extensively
with the stability assessment. Even if adequate from a stability perspective, the existing
H regulatory framework and the supervisory practices may need reform from the develop-
ment perspective. Certain areas not normally considered in stability-oriented assessments,
I such as microfinance and development banking, warrant attention from the development
perspective. Moreover, every sector that is relevant to stability can have an important
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Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
development dimension. Notwithstanding the overlap of themes, the focus of the sectoral
and infrastructural development reviews is different from, and complementary to, that of 1
the stability assessment. For each sector, the development review is designed to consider
whether policy or legislative changes are needed to enhance the ability and incentive of 2
market participants to deliver financial services.
The types of question asked in analyzing financial structure and development are 3
often different from those that take center stage in the stability assessment. For example,
are regulatory restrictions on bank entry and conduct (including interest rate ceilings, 4
ownership, branching, and automated teller machines [ATMs]) unduly constraining,
and do they act as barriers to competition and to the extension of financial services to 5
underserved segments? Is the regulation of insurance company investments hampering
their contribution to long-term funding of enterprises? Is there an adequate enabling legal 6
framework for the emergence of widely accessed credit registries? Are judicial practice,
funding, and skills supportive of speedy and low-cost debt recovery? Does the regulatory
7
framework for payments systems support an efficient and low-cost network of retail pay-
ments throughout the country?
The overlap between stability and development raises both practical and conceptual
8
issues for the sectoral reviews: At the practical level, there is the need to coordinate
information gathering to avoid duplication of effort. At the conceptual level, there is 9
the need to ensure that the recommendations mesh well together. In practice, the two
perspectives—stability and development, reinforce each other in terms of recommenda- 10
tions more often than they create a tension or tradeoff. For example, legal procedures
for enhancing creditor rights tend both to reduce the risk of loan losses undermining 11
the soundness of the banking system and to increase the willingness of intermediaries
to extend credit. Yet there can be some apparent tension, for example, when entry of 12
foreign-owned banks—although improving the quality and price of services to the rest
of the economy—is seen as a threat to the profitability of incumbents (a stability issue). A
Apparent conflicts must be considered and resolved from a wider perspective of ensuring
long-term, stable financial development in the interest of the economy at large. One issue B
in this context is whether the system is sufficiently robust (stability analysis) to withstand
the potential shocks associated with liberalization that will eventually be needed for
C
development reasons. In this sense, the stability analysis can provide some guidance to the
timing and sequencing of development-oriented reforms. A detailed analysis of sequenc-
ing issues is presented in chapter 12.
D
E
4.2 Quantitative Benchmarking
F
If we are to obtain an overall picture of where the financial sector is, or is not, perform-
ing well, then the performance of financial intermediaries and markets—in terms of total G
assets, scope of activity, depth, efficiency, and penetration—can be compared to a care-
fully chosen set of comparator countries. National authorities are likely to be interested in H
countries in the same region, as well as those of a similar size and a similar level or higher
levels of per capita income.3 The type of indicators that would be appropriate is discussed I
in chapter 2 and summarized in box 4.1.
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
1 Box 4.1 Quantitative Indicators for Financial Structure and Development Assessment
The measures chosen as quantitative indicators for ing comparison; however, the assembly of breadth
2 financial structure and development assessment will and penetration indicators on a cross-country basis
naturally include basic indicators of financial depth is in the beginning stages. There is a clear ranking
expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product of cross-country data availability among different
3 (GDP). The indicators are proxies for the size of the sectors, with data on banking, insurance, and stock
different components of the financial sector and could markets more readily available than on bond markets
4 include credit to the private sector and broad money and microfinance. Quantitative benchmarking may
(M2) for banking; number of listed equities and bond also include some comparisons over time within
issues, market capitalization, and value traded of countries where feasible and should serve as basis for
5 financial markets for financial markets; and insurance more detailed analysis.
premium income and asset size for insurance. Infrastructural quality measures—contract enforce-
Data on breadth and penetration—which are prox- ment (including measures of the effectiveness of the
6 ies for the population’s access to different segments of court systems such as the speed of judicial conflict
the financial sector and, thus, for outreach—of finan- resolution), speed and effectiveness of insolven-
7 cial markets include bank branch and outlet inten- cy procedures, creditor and minority shareholder
sity and deposit and loan size distribution, as well as rights, presence of a credit registry, and firm entry
number of clients in the banking, nearbanking, and regulations—can be drawn from the World Bank’s
8 insurance sectors. The data gauge the share of the Doing Business Database. Also informative are user
population with access to financial services. Data on assessments from the World Business Environment
market structure—number of banks, concentration Survey.
9 in banking, and share of foreign-owned and govern- Finally, the quantitative indicators for finan-
ment-owned banks—are also relevant. Efficiency cial structure and development assessment can be
10 measures include interest margins, overhead costs or rounded off by relevant summary economic and
asset indicators, and turnover ratios for capital mar- social indicators such as GDP per capita, share of
kets. Indicators of efficiency and quality of payment the informal economy, illiteracy rate, total popula-
11 services include cash-to-GDP ratio, lags in check or tion size, and so forth, which can be selected from
payment order clearing, volume and value of checks the World Development Indicators published by the
or payment orders processed in retail and large value World Bank.
12 payment systems, and number and density of ATMs. A more detailed presentation of financial structure
Indicators for size, depth, and efficiency are avail- indicators, including definitional issues and data
A able for a large cross-section of countries, thus allow- sources, is contained in chapter 2.
B
C Ideally, given data availability, it may be possible to use the results of research studies
that have identified causal factors for cross-country differences in depth, efficiency, and
other dimensions of financial development. For example, several studies have attempted
D
to explain differences in average bank margins—key indicators of the price efficiency of
banking in terms of policy, institutional, and macroeconomic variables. Those variables
E
include the bank’s size, a measure of property rights protection, and other bank- and
country-level characteristics, such as bank concentration, output gap, and interest rate
F
level.4 If those policy and institutional variables are available for the country in ques-
tion, the results of the studies can be used to throw light on potential improvements that
G
could be achieved through better policies and better institutions. The residual between
the expected value of average bank margins in the country predicted by the study and
H
the actual margins, if positive, will point to the need for closer analysis of idiosyncratic
features in the country—features that may be contributing to the gap. (For an illustration
I
of this technique in practice in Kenya, see appendix E.) A similar approach can be used
74
Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
for banking depth where macro-variables, such as inflation and the level of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, are key determinants along with institutional variables, such as 1
shareholder and creditor rights (e.g., see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003).
There are also some cross-country studies of other dimensions, including insurance 2
penetration, stock market capitalization, and turnover, although those studies may not
yet be sufficiently well established for heavy reliance to be placed on them for bench- 3
marking purposes. Along with other dimensions, including access to financial services,
cross-country research is not yet sufficiently developed to support this kind of benchmark- 4
ing. In those cases, simple cross-country comparisons against peers can, nevertheless, be
informative and can point to areas of deficiency. 5
4.3 Review of Legal, Informational, and Transactional Technology 6
Infrastructures for Access and Development
7
The major cross-cutting infrastructures can be grouped under the three headings of legal,
informational, and transactional technology.5 The robustness of legal infrastructures is 8
universally acknowledged as crucial to a healthy financial system. Creditor protection
in principle and in practice is central, as is bankruptcy law and its implementation. In 9
both of those areas, reform of the court system is often at the heart of needed reforms.
Corporate governance law and practice can also be seen as coming under this heading. 10
Informational infrastructures include accounting and auditing rules and practice, plus the
legal and organizational requirements for public or private credit registries and property 11
registries. Other aspects, such as the ratings industry, may be relevant in more-advanced,
middle-income countries. Internationally recognized accounting and auditing standards 12
exist, and assessments of their observance, when available, can be useful for both stability
and development assessments. The most important transactional technology infrastruc- A
tures—relating to wholesale payments and settlements—may already be assessed using
the Core Principles of Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSIPS). (See chapter B
11 for details of CPSIPS.) The additional dimension required for development purposes
is the functioning of the retail payments system: although it is not vulnerable to sudden
failure on a large scale, it is not considered “systemically important” in the sense of the
C
CPSIPS. The efficiency with which the legal, information, and transactional technol-
ogy infrastructures support financial intermediation in the country plays a critical role in
D
access and development. Detailed assessments of those areas are described in chapters 9,
10, and 11 of this handbook, and they provide information on the quality of the infra- E
structure elements, which are discussed below.
F
4.3.1 Legal Infrastructure
G
The efficient functioning of the legal system is indispensable for effective financial inter-
mediation (e.g., see La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, and Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). H
Although discussed in more detail in chapter 9 of this handbook, the following discus-
sion highlights the aspects of the legal system that are important for development assess- I
ment.
75
Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
In addition to the cross-country quantitative evidence mentioned in box 4.1, underly-
1 ing factual information for this exercise can come both from any completed assessments of
formal codes such as the Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights
2 Systems (World Bank 2001b) and from interviews with banks, enterprises, academics, and
other market participants.6
3 The effective creation, perfection, and enforcement of collateral is a cross-cutting
issue for financial intermediation and requires assessing the appropriate legislation, the
4 property registries (including stamp duties and notary fees), the court system, and the
out-of-court enforcement mechanisms. If collateral taking is limited to certain assets or
5 if high collateral-to-debt ratios are required, this limitation can ration credit to certain
sectors or size groups of borrowers. The effectiveness of the collateral process can also
6 affect the terms of lending, such as interest rates, along with the competitiveness of the
lending market.
The effectiveness of debt enforcement and insolvency procedures in terms of cost and
7
time it takes, both through and outside the court system, is important for effective and
efficient intermediation. Expedited enforcement systems that use private negotiation
8 and out-of-court settlement can be very helpful, if available. The possibility of flexible
ways of achieving corporate financial restructuring, albeit without undermining creditors’
9 position, is important. A deficient insolvency framework can restrict the use of the court
system overall and can lead to suboptimal out-of-court settlements or even restrictions on
10 the access to, and the terms of, lending.
The functioning of the court system is crucial. The evaluation here could include
11 an assessment of the legal profession along several dimensions, such as education, skills
funding, fees, and ethical behavior. The effectiveness of specialized courts in local cir-
12 cumstances can be examined if we bear in mind that those courts can help in situations
where complex commercial issues arise and even in situations with less-complex issues,
A such as loan recovery. The courts may work faster and more consistently than regular
courts—though experience here is mixed, and it may be better in the long run to work
B toward an overall improvement in the functioning of the court system.
The state of corporate governance, including the relationships among management,
majority owners, and outside investors, can have an important effect on the ease with
C
which outside investors provide finance and the price thereof. Both the rules and the
practice of corporate governance need to be considered; if a formal corporate governance
D assessment has been carried out, its findings can be drawn upon here.7
E
4.3.2 Information Infrastructures
F Asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and, thus, the transaction costs
can be reduced if there is readily available information on the financial condition of bor-
G rowers and especially on their history of credit performance. In particular, two areas of
the information infrastructure should not be neglected: (a) transparency in borrowers’
H financial statements enables lenders to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness on present and
past financial and operational performance, and (b) readily available credit information
I on borrowers enables lenders to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness according to their past
performance within the financial system.8
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Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
Credit registries, if they exist, vary widely in the information that is being collected
and that is available to financial institutions; hence, they vary in their effectiveness in
1
improving access. The effect on access is influenced by characteristics such as (a) which
financial and nonfinancial institutions provide data and have access to the data (the more 2
the better); (b) whether only negative information (i.e., on defaults and delinquencies)
or also positive information, including interest rate, maturity, and collateral, is collected 3
and provided (positive information improves the potential use of the registry for credit
appraisal); (c) for what kind of loans is the information collected; and (d) for how long 4
is information kept. While there are reasons to expect privately owned registries to out-
perform those operated by public agencies, there are instances of effective publicly owned 5
registries. Local conditions can influence the choice here. Existing credit registries should
be evaluated not only on their design features, but also on how they have performed in 6
practice. The legal and regulatory environment is important for existence and effective-
ness of credit registries and other financial information vendors. While protection of con- 7
sumer privacy is important, unduly restrictive rules here can hamper information sharing
on borrowers to the detriment of their access to credit. 8
Credit registries may be complemented by other providers of financial information on
borrowers. Commercial information vendors, such as Bloomberg or Reuters, trade associa- 9
tions, chambers of commerce, or credit-rating agencies, might also contribute to transpar-
ency in the financial market. Finally, there might be private information-sharing agree- 10
ments between financial institutions outside the formal structure of a credit registry.
Accounting and auditing standards and practices are important elements of the infor-
11
mation environment in that they govern companies’ disclosure of financial information
to the public. A full assessment of the accounting and auditing standards (see chapter 10
12
for further details on these standards) in this area might not always be practicable, but
the standards, nevertheless, represent the overall goals that should be aspired to and can
be used as a reference for identifying information-based barriers to enhanced financing
A
for the corporate sector.
B
4.3.3 Transactional Technology Infrastructures C
The effective transfer of money between customers of the same and of different institu-
tions is one of the main functions of the financial systems. While the stability assessment D
of the payment system is mostly interested in wholesale systems, the development assess-
ment focuses more on the cost of and access to retail payment services. Development E
assessment includes evaluating the effectiveness of the check and money transfer system
in terms of time and cost. It also entails assessing the access to those services, either F
directly through banks or indirectly through other financial institutions that use banks as
agents. Indicators to assess the effectiveness of the payment system include the cost and G
time to transfer money. As alternative indicators of access, some studies have surveyed
the small numbers of the population and of subgroups who have a transactions banking H
account, debit card, or credit card, as well as the distribution of travel time to the nearest
ATM or money transmission point. Unfortunately, as yet, there is no cross-country dataset
I
for such access indicators.
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
4.4 Sectoral Development Reviews
1
2 Sectoral developmental reviews complement the assessments of regulatory standards.
Over the past several decades, extensive institutional change and experimentation in
3 advanced economies have led to the emergence of elaborate regimes of regulation and
supervision of the banking, insurance, and securities markets. Those regimes are designed
to ensure integrity of the functioning within the sectors and to avoid behavior that is
4 likely to contribute to failure. They have evolved largely in response to the rapid develop-
ment of the financial sector in advanced economies rather than as a means of promoting
5 the development of the sector—though, in several cases, regulatory liberalization has
been influenced by a perceived risk to the competitiveness of domestic financial markets
6 in an increasingly global financial system.
The standards and codes used for those sectors essentially codify what has emerged
7 as the common core of what remains a somewhat diverse set of regulatory institutions.
While the standards and codes represent a fairly firm and widely agreed framework for
8 assessment on the prudential side, the mechanics of overcoming barriers to development
of what are still unsophisticated financial systems in low- and middle-income countries
9 are not something for which a comprehensive template can be distilled from current prac-
tice. Indeed, the standards and codes either explicitly or implicitly assume the presence
10 of much of what is sought in the goal of developing the financial system and at the same
time contain (to some extent) principles that guide institutional development and good
11 practices in financial institutions. Promoting institutional development, however, raises
issues of sequencing and absorptive capacity in implementing policy reforms. Because of
12 those considerations, conducting the development assessment for any given subsector is
necessarily less categorical, more subjective, and arguably more difficult than assessing the
relevant standards and codes.
A For most low- and middle-income countries, a brief and selective review of devel-
opment issues provides the information that is needed on the preconditions for a full
B standards and codes assessment. Where standards and codes for a sector are not being
fully assessed, the review of development issues can be accompanied by a less detailed,
C stability-oriented, regulatory assessment. The assessor should highlight deficiencies in
quantity (scale and reach), quality, and price of the services provided and should attempt
D to identify the infrastructural weaknesses that have contributed to those deficiencies, as
well as any policy flaws—including flaws in competition and tax policy—that have likely
E contributed to the deficiencies. Although some of the needed data are covered in cross-
country databases (as mentioned in chapter 2), for many other dimensions in each of the
F sectors, only noncomparable national sources are currently available. Those dimensions
would include aspects such as the stock market free-float, reliance by large firms on inter-
G national depositary receipts, transactions costs for securities markets, prices of insurance
and efficiency of insurance products, and maturity structure of intermediary portfolios.
H The assessors must use their judgment in evaluating whatever information is available on
such matters.
Because competitiveness issues have a pervasive influence on sectoral performance,
I
the issues need to be analyzed in all sectors. The competitive structure of the industry
78
Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
is a multi-dimensional concept in itself. That structure is not merely measured by con-
centration ratios and by Herfindahl indices, but—in acknowledgment of the distinction 1
between concentration and contestability—also requires an understanding of regulatory
influences, including restrictive regulations on branching or cross-regional service provi- 2
sion, on permissible lines of business, on product pricing (e.g., interest ceilings and premi-
um rate floors), or on portfolio allocation (especially for insurance companies, including 3
localization rules, but also including reserve requirements and so forth). Is the market de
facto segmented, thereby limiting the pro-efficiency forces of competition? Is ownership 4
of the main intermediaries linked to government or to industrial groups, thereby tending
to entrench incumbents rather than enabling new entrepreneurs? 5
In addition to our looking at the aggregate national position, it is important, though
often difficult, to assess the reach of each financial sector along the dimensions of geo- 6
graphic region, economic sector, size of firm, and number of households. Of course, the
large and well-established firms in the main cities will have greatest access. The question
7
is whether the gap between those and smaller firms and households in smaller centers
and in rural areas is more than it should be. Sources of information on direct access to
financial services—with a focus on those at different levels of income—are diverse and
8
scarce. There is a growing appreciation of the importance of compiling data on who has
access to what financial services, and efforts are under way to increase systematic cover- 9
age of financial issues in surveys of households, business users, financial service providers
and their regulators, and national experts. All four types of information are needed for a 10
comprehensive review.9
Going beyond aggregate measures of efficiency, availability, and cost of more-advanced 11
products needs to be benchmarked for each of the main sectors. What products do users
identify as lacking? How much maturity transformation does each sector achieve? How 12
much is achieved overall through the interaction of the sectors? One may also mention
consumer protection legislation, which, though present, is not uniformly at the fore in A
stability assessments.
Often, the review will reveal that the source of shortcomings is mostly in the policy B
environment (including the nonprudential or unneeded prudential regulations and taxa-
tion and the effects of state ownership) or in deficiencies in the legal, information, or
C
transactional technology infrastructures. Such policy and infrastructural issues will often
have a cross-cutting effect on several subsectors and need to be reported as such (see sec-
tion 4.6).
D
E
4.4.1 Banking
The sectoral assessment for banking is at the heart of development issues in finance F
because of the central role of banking in the financial systems of most developing coun-
tries. In addition to what can be quantified on the basis of available statistics, the fact- G
finding requires broad-ranging discussions with market participants, as well as with the
regulators.10 An effective banking system will be characterized by considerable depth H
(measured, for example, by total assets); breadth in terms both of customer base (lending
to a wide range of sectors and regions, without neglecting the needs of creditworthy bor- I
rowers in any sector or region) and of product range (maturities, repayment schedules,
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
flexibility, convenience, risk profile, and nonbanking products where permitted); and
1 efficiency. Overhead costs, interest spreads, and interest margins give an indication of
efficiency, though taxes and other requirements can substantially influence the spread, as
2 explained below.
3
Quantitative Benchmarking
4 Benchmarking the performance of the banking system needs to go well beyond tabulation
of cross-country comparisons of available indicators and should be based on an analysis of
5 factors governing the variations in the indicators. The main indicators need to be looked
at in terms of their development over time, in relation to the rest of the national financial
system, and in terms of national causal factors. In addition, international comparisons
6
should ideally be made in a more structured way, thus drawing on research findings.
As an example, assessment of bank efficiency and competitiveness requires information
7 on interest rate spreads and margins,11 which are influenced by both bank- and country-
level characteristics. The analysis and decomposition of interest spreads and margins can
8 help assess the existence and severity of deficiencies in the banking sector.12 A useful
device is to use accounting identities to decompose interest rate spreads into five compo-
9 nents: (a) overhead costs, (b) loan–loss provisions, (c) reserve requirements, (d) taxes, and
(e) (the residual) profits. Decomposition helps identify institutional and legal deficiencies
10 that explain high spreads. Both spreads and margins can be compared across countries and
across the underlying factors derived (see appendix E, which is based on Kenya).
11 Penetration of and access to banking services are important dimensions for which a
broad international database is not yet available, but for which national statistics can be
12 very informative. Geographic branch, ATM, and bank outlet data give a first indication of
the penetration of banking services across geographic areas of the country. A comparison
A of bank branch density with other countries can give an indication of bank penetration
but has to be treated with care, because it does not include data on nonbank service pro-
B viders. Similarly, a within-country geographic comparison of penetration should consider
other nearbank providers, such as savings banks or cooperatives. Where appropriate,
account should also be taken of alternative delivery channels, such as ATMs, phone
C banking, and Internet banking, plus novel ways of providing access to financial services
in more remote areas, such as mobile branches and correspondent banking. There may
D be regulatory obstacles to penetration: What are the regulatory requirements for opening
and closing branches and other delivery channels, and what are the licensing procedures
E and fees for doing so?
F
Scope of Activities
G If one is to understand the role of the banking system in contributing to the functions
of finance in the country being assessed, it is necessary to clarify what are the range and
H types of financial services being provided by both banks and nearbanks. The institutional
organization of the financial service provision varies significantly across countries. On the
I one extreme might be universal banks that offer not only deposit, loan, and payment ser-
vices, but also leasing, factoring, insurance, and investment bank products. On the other
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Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
extreme, one might find a system where banks are restricted to deposit, loan, and payment
services and where there is a large number and variety of other banklike and nonbanking
1
institutions that offer leasing, factoring, and mortgage finance. The institutional organiza-
tion of the financial service provision is often driven by historic development and by the 2
regulatory environment. Even if specialized financial services are offered by specialized
financial institutions, there are often ownership links between them and banks. Finally, 3
an institutionally diverse financial system may have converged with nominally different
institutions that offer the same services. In this case, it is important to assess whether 4
there is a level playing field between institutions and nondiscriminatory regulatory treat-
ment. 5
Competition and Market Segmentation 6
Market structure can be measured using concentration ratios (assets of largest three or 7
five banks to total banking assets), number of banks, and Herfindahl indices. One has to
be careful, however, in equating market structure with competitiveness. Contestability of 8
the market—the threat of entry—can be a more important determinant of bank behav-
ior. Regulatory indicators, such as formal entry requirements, share of bank applications
9
rejected over the past five years, and openness of the sector to foreign entrants, can give
an indication of contestability of the market. Competition from other financial institu-
tions (such as insurance companies, large credit cooperatives, and capital markets) can
10
play an important role in determining banking system competitiveness. The ownership
structure of banks (foreigners, closely held by locals, nonfinancial corporations, govern-
11
ment, widely held, cooperative structure, and so forth) can be important for the degree
of competition, because banks of different ownership often have different mandates and 12
different clienteles (e.g., see Claessens and Laeven 2004 and box 4.2). In turn, ownership
patterns are influenced by regulation and policy on entry, exit, and mergers and acquisi- A
tions.
Is the market structure segmented (with less competition than might appear from an B
overall concentration index) to the extent that different groups of banks deal with dif-
ferent classes of customer (with each customer facing relatively few options)? Evidence C
on market segmentation is often more anecdotal than quantitative. Interviews with both
banks and enterprises often help to determine categories of banks, with competition D
within each category but with little across categories. There might also be variation in
competitiveness across different products. Loan and deposit size distribution data can give E
supporting evidence for market segmentation, if such data are available. It is also impor-
tant to assess segmentation between the banking system and other parts of the financial F
system. This assessment can be important for microenterprises and small enterprises that
start their “careers” as borrowers with cooperative or specialized financial institutions; G
segmentation might prevent them from growing into customers of mainstream banks. If
one has established the main features here, it is important to attempt to determine the H
extent to which they are influenced in a harmful way by inappropriate regulation. This
examination could include looking at limits on their lines of business, universal banking,
I
and branching restrictions.
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
1 Box 4.2 Access to Financial Services from Abroad
Development Role of Foreign Banks supervisor can accelerate technology transfer to the
2 local market.
National authorities and local commentators often
express concern at the likely development conse-
Access to Foreign Securities Markets
3 quences of a growing share of the financial sector
coming under foreign control. The typical fears are The tendency of larger companies to take their
that small enterprises and remote, rural areas will not stock market listings to larger international mar-
4 be served by foreign-owned banks and that cherry- kets—whether through a primary listing or dual list-
picking by foreign-owned banks will weaken local ing abroad, or by issuance of depository receipts—is
banks. In fact, although the client profile of foreign- often seen as an adverse development by local mar-
5 owned banks often differs sharply from that of locally ket intermediaries because the intermediaries receive
owned banks (especially when foreign-owned banks a smaller share of total fees and commissions. Thus,
6 have only a limited retail presence because of regula- local market liquidity may be adversely affected.
tory restrictions or their own business strategy), it is However, from the perspective of the economy as a
often observed that an expansion in a foreign-owned whole, the net benefit is likely to be positive, with
7 bank’s share of the total market is associated with a not only a lower cost of capital, but also an indirect
greater emphasis on the small and medium enterprise effect through the importation of enhanced stan-
(SME) sector by local banks. Checking on such dards of corporate transparency, which are likely to
8 dimensions of the competitive dynamics of the sector be spread, at least partly, to firms that do not have
will help alert national authorities to any shortcom- international listings.
ings along those dimensions. Opening the local equity market to foreign inves-
9 The implicit training provided by the leading inter- tors is also generally seen as a positive dimension
national banks both for other market participants and with lower average cost of capital and probably
10 for regulators can represent an almost costless gain lower net volatility. However, opening nonresident
for national authorities. The relationship between access to domestic financial markets and enhanc-
foreign-owned banks and regulators can be somewhat ing resident access to foreign financial markets will
11 delicate in that regulators are responsible for local require the careful sequencing of capital account
oversight of the foreign entity. Nevertheless, that liberalization measures as part of a broader financial
entity likely enjoys superior risk management prac- market development strategy. These considerations
12 tices and other systems and head office scrutiny. By are further explained in chapter 12.
observing and learning from those practices, the local
A
B Taxation of Banking
C Taxation and quasi-taxation issues are important for banking. Among the most prominent
are (a) the issue of loan–loss provisioning (can banks deduct provisions allowed by the
banking regulator from income before calculating tax?) and (b) the implicit taxes through
D reserve requirements. The former can affect the incentive to make adequate provisions
promptly, while the latter can affect interest spreads, especially in times of high inflation
E and high nominal interest rates.
F
Other Issues
G Are minimum deposit requirements or fees for customers effectively cutting out the
small depositor? What lines of business do banks find most profitable and unprofitable?
H Are there any pressures from government to do lines of business that are unprofitable?
Do banks submit to such pressure? Analyzing the interbank market is important, so one
should ask the following: How liquid is the market, is there tiering (another indicator of
I
segmentation), and who are the main takers?
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Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
4.4.2 Near-banks
1
While some nearbanks, such as finance companies, can be seen as an annex to the com-
mercial banking system, some smaller scale near-banks may have sufficient development 2
importance to call for special treatment. Such near-banks consist of specialized micro-
finance firms, cooperative credit unions, specialized mortgage banks, and government- 3
sponsored specialized development intermediaries. Because of their modest size or the
fact that their source of funding is stable and may come from stable external or wholesale 4
sources, they do not raise systemic stability concerns but do expand access to financial
services. Some near-banks provide a focused set of services to a broad clientele (e.g., postal
5
savings banks and mortgage banks); others specialize in serving a particular economic sec-
tor (e.g., specialized microfinance institutions [MFIs] that may target microenterprises or
the poor and near-poor).
6
Many categories of nearbanks are not operated on a for-profit basis (especially donor-
promoted microfinance entities, government-owned development banks, and, to an
7
extent, cooperatively owned entities such as credit unions). This feature generally calls
for a distinct regulatory framework, and a review will be appropriate in many countries
8
where those institutions are sizable.13
Among the major categories are non-depository finance companies, many of which 9
specialize in particular types of lending such as leasing and factoring. Many of them are
captive subsidiaries of banks that have been separately constituted for reasons of legal 10
convenience or in response to regulatory restrictions on banks. The funding of those insti-
tutions is typically from the parent bank. Independent finance companies need to find 11
funding in the wholesale markets, typically through private placement of notes, though
they may use an organized bond market if one is present. The entities can be important in 12
providing borrowing facilities for SMEs, and obstacles to their effective operation should
be monitored. A
Mortgage banks (see box 4.3), savings banks, and cooperative credit unions typically
concentrate on the needs of households both in terms of deposits and for lending prod- B
ucts. However, some savings banks operate as narrow banks, lending their resources to
government. To the extent that they are locally or regionally based, their survival increas- C
ingly depends on the effectiveness of national umbrella organizations. They also depend
on not suffering from tax discrimination (though they will often go further and argue D
for tax privileges that are hard to rationalize from a welfare point of view). Interviews
with those entities will often reveal special environmental challenges that inhibit their E
effective functioning. Because detailed prudential regulation of the institutions is not
cost-effective, they often operate under blanket restrictions that limit their expansion F
and activities. Judgment must be exercised as to whether such restrictions can safely be
relaxed. G
Non-deposit-taking microfinance firms (typically donor funded) may not require pru-
dential regulation from the financial authorities, although an element of forced saving is H
often built into their operations. Increasingly, though, MFIs seek to move into offering
deposit services, so the challenge of ensuring that prudential regulation is no more intru-
I
sive than is needed arises here also.
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
1 Box 4.3 Finance of Housing
Financing residential mortgages is a key function effective duration of conventional mortgages, thus
2 of financial systems in advanced economies, there- creating a demand for price-index-linked or other
by accounting for a relatively high share of total low-risk contracts (compare to Jaffee and Renaud
financial assets. Traditionally, specialized mortgage 1996).
3 intermediaries offering a limited range of other ser- Availability of long-term mortgage finance enhances
vices were the major players in this segment, and they the quality of housing, especially for middle-income
4 often benefited from fiscal privileges. More recently, households. Cross-country experience suggests that
the removal of fiscal privileges and the addition of macroeconomic stability and financial sector policies
enhanced competition have tended to widen the are more important in ensuring such availability than
5 range of originating intermediaries for mortgage lend- is the general level of per capita income. Improved
ing. Those intermediaries, in turn, have increasingly housing finance policy reaches well beyond the
securitized much of the mortgages that they originated financial sector and includes measures to improve
6 and have sold them in the wholesale market. the supply of serviced land, building codes, adequate
Long-term mortgages entail particular risks wheth- legal framework for land development and real
er they are at fixed or floating rates. Fixed-rate mort- estate, well-targeted subsidies for those who cannot
7 gages may require high real yields or even may not be afford adequate housing, and so forth. Because of
able to be sold in a volatile macroeconomic environ- this wide reach and because mortgage finance has
8 ment. Holders of such mortgages can face advance increasingly become part of mainstream finance, a
repayment risk if the general level of market rates particular focus on the subsector of housing finance
falls, unless prepayment penalties can be enforced. may not be warranted for financial sector assessments
9 Conversely, high inflation rates may shorten the in most countries.
10
11
The indications are that sustained effectiveness of MFIs will require that they should
12 operate on a relatively large scale. If so, policies that encourage larger-scale operation over
a proliferation of small entities is to be preferred. Subsidized interest rates offered by MFIs
A are not compatible with graduation to self-sustaining operation and are generally not to
be encouraged, though the limited spillovers into mainstream finance mean that a subsidy
B need not be considered crucial.
Subsidized lending by larger government-sponsored development banks causes dis-
C tortions (see box 4.4). Those banks can seriously distort the incentive for a balanced
provision of lending products by commercial banks, as well as creating the conditions for
corruption. Moving government-sponsored development banks as far as possible either
D (downstream) toward a commercial operation or (upstream) to become explicitly the
lending arm of the fiscal authority (with loans at unsubsidized rates) will, in most cases,
E seem the optimal direction of policy.
F
4.4.3 Insurance and Collective Investment Arrangements
G As with the banking sector, insurance and collective savings generate financial services
on both the asset and the liability side. On the liability side, they provide investment
H outlets and risk-reduction instruments; on the asset side, they typically represent the most
important block of professionally managed long-term funds. Both aspects need to be kept
I in mind in the assessment. Insurance and fund management industries often overlap, in
that insurance firms often sell pensions or manage pension funds, other mutual funds and
84
Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
Box 4.4 Role of Government-Owned Banks 1
The disappointing performance—not only of govern- tend to slow growth. However, development assess-
ment-owned banks but also, more important, of sys- ment must pay attention to subsidized and other 2
tems in which the banks will play a major part—has loans made on other-than-commercial principles
been extensively documented in recent cross-country insofar as those loans tend to discourage private
empirical literature (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine banks from incurring the cost of developing risk-
3
2004 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer assessment techniques that are needed to lend into
2002). This performance does not imply that indi- difficult segments, such as small and medium enter- 4
vidual countries and individual government-owned prises (SMEs) and rural areas. Government-owned
banks cannot perform exceptionally well along this banks often fail to deliver services to their stated
dimension, but it does call for special attention to target markets—with subsidies often being captured 5
some dimensions along which many government- by large, state-owned borrowers or politically con-
dominated banking systems are known to underper- nected firms—which can damage the performance of
form. the sector as a whole. 6
In the context of development assessment, the The mission of government-owned banks should,
effect of government ownership is not simply a ques- therefore, be examined for compatibility with the
tion of embedded fiscal costs in a nonperforming or competitive provision of financial services generally;
7
problematic loan portfolio reflecting the inheritance their governance structures should also be scrutinized
of politically or socially motivated loans. Such fiscal for consistency with the stated mission. 8
costs can imply a future national tax burden that will
9
10
unit trusts, and so forth. Some investments of those industries are in the form of bank
deposits or other unit trusts, so that a measuring scale in a manner that adequately nets 11
out intersectoral claims can be both important and sometimes difficult in the attempt to
benchmark scale. In addition to one’s looking at the current position, projections of future 12
developments, especially of pension funds, can be possible and relevant for a view as to
the likely contribution of those sectors to funds availability.14 A
The range of products supplied, as well as their pricing (relative to actuarial fairness),
is also an area where deficiencies may exist. It is important to determine whether such B
gaps are attributable to overregulation, to lack of competition (including restrictions on
entry), or to lack of organizational capacity and skills in the industries. Because of the
diversity of potential insurance products,15 a comprehensive analysis of cost and avail-
C
ability would be an extensive exercise. Absent such a study, information can, neverthe-
less, be obtained from market participants. Industry professionals will typically be vocal D
in identifying policy barriers (including regulatory failure to approve policy design) that
inhibit their provision of particular services and products; users will be a better source for E
identifying others that are unavailable or overpriced because of industry inefficiencies
or market power. A similar situation prevails with regard to other collective investment F
outlets. The tax and regulatory treatment of different insurance, pension, and mutual
fund–type products has been a strong influence on the development of the insurance and G
collective investment sectors, and the whole market can be skewed by distorting incen-
tives that should be avoided as a matter of sound development policy.16 H
Coverage of the subsectors also needs to examine market structure in terms of con-
centration and ownership. In countries where there is a mandatory private tier to pension I
provision, issues of competition become especially important, because the rules regarding
85
Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
switching, fee structures, and the like can have a large effect on the net return to pension
1 investors.
The investment policy of insurance firms, pension funds, and other collective savings
2 entities is a key to increasing the availability of term and risk finance to domestic industry.
This policy can be subject to severe restrictions (such as ceilings on permissible percent-
3 ages of the portfolio that can be placed in certain broad categories of investment, such as
property or equities), which must be examined for their appropriateness in the context of
4 local capacity. While most of the restrictions are supposedly intended to be prudential in
nature, in practice some can have the opposite effect, lowering the return on the funds’
5 overall portfolio without reducing volatility. This effect can be especially true with regard
to requirements to hold government securities and prohibitions on international diversi-
6 fication.17 Requirements to cede reinsurance to a state-owned reinsurance company have
similar effects.
7 The long-term viability of the social security and government employee pension
schemes needs some examination. Their wider effects on the economy, including the
8 effects of compulsory contributions, are generally fiscal matters that are beyond the scope
of the financial sector assessment. However, it is necessary to be generally aware of those
9 wider dimensions if one is to understand the likely evolution of the system. Some exami-
nation of the issues could strengthen the assessment of both the financial structure and
10 development.
The health of the insurance and collective investment sectors is often intertwined
with that of the organized securities markets. Those sectors are the major investors in
11
securities, and the level and volatility of asset returns in the sectors depend on the micro-
structure and soundness of securities markets.
12
A 4.4.4 Securities Markets
The sectoral development assessment is to some extent subsumed in International
B Organization of Securities Commissions’s (IOSCO’s) Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation (see box 4.5). Investor protection, fairness, efficiency, and trans-
C parency are among the most important prerequisites for the development of organized
securities markets. These important elements of effective securities regulation are also
D covered in the IOSCO objectives and principles. When investors have confidence, the
market tends to grow.
E In addition, the assessor needs to verify, by looking at the quantitative measures, that
the market is, in fact, deep and liquid; that transactions and issuing costs are reasonable;
F and that an adequate range of both debt- and equity-type instruments are available. The
range of instruments would include some derivatives if this inclusion can be supported by
G the scale of activity and by the technical needs and sophistication of the market partici-
pants. The assessor also needs to look at the degree to which the market can provide new
H funding through public offerings. Benchmarking of the securities markets needs to pay
attention to some hidden factors. For instance, in addition to market micro-structure and
market size, the liquidity of the securities markets also depends on the degree to which
I
securities are not held in blocks by insiders and, as such, are not normally available for
86
Chapter 4: Assessing Financial Structure and Financial Development
Box 4.5 Standards Assessments and Financial Sector Development 1
Standards assessments can inform development assess- for a range of policies to implement standards to help
ments. Sectoral reviews, plus an understanding of the improve efficiency of financial firms and to assist 2
state of development and the soundness of sectors, with their institutional development.
are needed to inform standards and stability assess-
ment. The standards, codes, and core principles that
• All supervisory standards include a set of princi- 3
ples relating to the prudent operations of finan-
are important for the sound and efficient functioning
cial intermediaries covering risk management,
of the financial system cover both financial supervi-
risk concentration, capital adequacy, corporate 4
sion and financial infrastructure, and they are listed
governance and internal controls, customer
in box A.2.
International standards and codes for financial
protection, and prevention of financial abuse. 5
systems supervision have been designed to promote Policies that promote such prudent operations
effective supervision and regulation of individual can help strengthen the efficiency of the institu-
financial institutions and markets. Those standards tions, strengthen their governance, and enable 6
(for banking, insurance, and securities market super- more effective and appropriately priced delivery
of financial services. Information on those mat-
vision) promulgate a set of objectives, core principles,
and good practices that cover regulatory governance, ters from standards assessments provides valu- 7
regulatory practices, prudential framework for the able input into development-oriented policy
operations of financial firms, and financial integrity formulation.
• Some development concerns are addressed in
8
and safety net arrangements. All supervisory stan-
dards recognize that a set of preconditions (outside IAIS Insurance Core Principle (ICP) 1. ICP 1
the scope of those standards) must be met to allow sets out preconditions for effective insurance 9
effective implementation of the standards. The pre- supervision, which represent a subset of the pre-
conditions include sound and sustainable macroeco- conditions for a well-developed insurance sec-
nomic policies; a well-developed public infrastructure tor. Prudential insurance assessments can also 10
(accounting and auditing, corporate governance, help in the fact-finding efforts for the develop-
ment assessment, for example, in relation to
legal framework, and so forth); procedures for resolv-
investment requirements (ICP 21). Several
11
ing problem institutions; and an appropriate level of
systemic protection and safety nets. other useful sets of standards and guidelines
A review of preconditions for effective supervi- have been developed for other elements of this 12
sion—some of which are covered by their own stan- broad subsector (for a compendium, see OECD
dards—can clearly help identify gaps in infrastructure 2002).
and can provide inputs into development assessment. • IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Security A
Similarly, assessments of the financial infrastructure Regulations promote robust and efficient finan-
cial markets. Thus, IOSCO principles 14–16
as part of development assessment can give informa-
tion on the adequacy of preconditions for effective aim to ensure that issuers are transparent and
B
supervision. A significant part of financial sector fair, principles 17–20 to ensure that collective
development policies relate to strengthening the investment schemes are equally trustworthy, C
public infrastructure. This strengthening not only and principle 28 to ensure that secondary mar-
promotes more efficient financial services with greater ket manipulation is inhibited. IOSCO principle
depth and access, but also creates conditions for effec- 23 deals with standards for the internal organi- D
tive supervision. zation and operational conduct of market inter-
Standards assessments themselves provide key mediaries to ensure adequate client protection
information needed for development assessment and and risk management.
E
F
G
trading. Estimates of this free-float can greatly reduce the apparent size of the market and
can put its true scale into perspective. H
The domestic bond market is often more weakly developed than equities, and causes
of this weakness should be reviewed. The reasons typically lie in tax rules; in the systemic I
dominance of banks, for whom a developed bond market would represent competition; or
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Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
in crowding out by heavy domestic government borrowing. More generally, government
1 debt management can have a decisive influence on the functioning of the bond market.18
Effective public debt management can help provide the benchmarks needed to price more
2 risky securities, and the physical and institutional infrastructures for government debt
markets could reinforce and complement the needed infrastructure for bond markets gen-
3 erally. The transactions technology infrastructure—in this case, also potentially includ-
ing such features as privileged market makers—may also be inadequate. These and other
4 prerequisites for bond market development are clearly described in World Bank (2001c),
which also notes how sensitive bond market development is to monetary policy manage-
5 ment and generally macroeconomic stability—prerequisites that lie beyond the scope of
development assessment.
6 Liquid securities markets require a minimum scale to be cost-effective. Certainly, the
cost built into the design of the trading platform and the regulatory burden can become
decisive. Overheads of the market itself and of the regulator can also be too heavy to be
7
borne by fees on the existing level of transactions. Where possible, the assessor should
attempt to calculate those costs and the degree to which they are being subsidized. This
8 calculation is especially important where consideration is being given to further com-
puterization, a step that often may not be cost-effective or necessary in small exchanges.
9 With many small securities markets, the inherent viability of the brokerage industry needs
to be checked, which has been a problem in several countries. In some cases, most brokers
10 are subsidiaries or divisions of banks, an arrangement that may help reduce overheads but
may limit the energy with which the brokers develop their services. Of course, the impor-
11 tant goal is not survival of the stockbrokers per se, but achievement of an optimal way of
giving local firms and investors access to liquid securities markets.
12 Many securities markets have been subsidized through tax concessions to listing com-
panies, but with limited success. Several countries have forgone substantial revenue in
A this way with the objective of encouraging the development of the stock exchange but
without generating any sizable activity in the market.
B The degree to which larger firms are going outside the country to issue shares or
depository receipts in advanced stock exchanges should be examined. While such behav-
ior can reduce local market liquidity, it also has the potential to result in the importation
C
of improved transparency and other practices by a demonstration effect. It also results in
lower funding costs for the companies that do have such access.
D More generally, the question for small countries of whether outsourcing and closer
integration with regional or global markets would be more effective than promotion of an
E onshore securities market must be seriously considered (compare to Bossone, Honohan,
and Long 2002).
F
4.5 The Demand-Side Reviews and the Effect of Finance on the
G Real Sector
H
Whereas stability assessments have normally emphasized the regulator and the regulated
I financial intermediaries and markets with comparatively little focus on the system’s users,19
development assessments are interested in the users and the extent to which the financial
88
